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This thesis examines the relationship between a country’s allocation of mineral rights and 
the rate of extraction of that country’s oil.  Empirical analysis shows that countries with 
privatized oil industries extract oil more quickly than countries with nationalized 
industries.  However, much of the relationship between mineral rights and extraction 
rates appears to stem from membership in OPEC.  Thus, it is unclear whether mineral 
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Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a 
property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his 
body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he 
removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour 
with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.  It 
being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this 
labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this 
labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right 
to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common 
for others. 
-John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government 
 
Capital is therefore not a personal, it is a social power.   When, therefore, capital is 
converted into common property, into the property of all members of society, personal 
property is not thereby transformed into social property. 




 Oil: in recent years, this three-letter word has come to dominate the worlds of 
policy, economics, national security, and international trade.  With the United States 
consuming more than twenty million barrels1—roughly $1.25 billion—per day, the role 
and relevance of petroleum in our daily lives needs no introduction.  In some cases, oil 
wealth has allowed small states to grow and prosper.  In others, expropriation of natural 
resource rents has propped up some of most repressive dictatorships in human history.  In 
all cases, however, the mechanisms controlling the extraction and sale of these prized 
hydrocarbons form a crucial link in the chain leading from petroleum to prosperity or 
poverty. 
 Property rights also featured prominently in the events that helped to define the 
twentieth century, and they promise to help shape the twenty-first.  The great battles 
between Soviet socialism and Western free market capitalism were essentially fought 
over the rights of individuals to own and control property.  These same battles are 
emerging again today.   
 Each government, in assigning or retaining the mineral rights to its oil, decides 
whether to nationalize its industry, often with a national oil company (NOC) controlling 
production, or to allow private-sector firms to control oil production. 
 The earliest NOCs, including Argentina’s YPF and Mexico’s Pemex, date to the 
early twentieth century.  It was the surge of new NOCs (mainly in the Gulf states) in the 
1970s, however, that changed the structure of the global oil industry.  Given oil’s 
strategic importance and the growing prevalence of state ownership and participation in 
the industry, many countries grew wary of ceding control of their oil wealth to private—
                                                 
1 Estimate from CIA World Factbook 2006 
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and usually foreign—oil companies.  Most NOCs today participate both in upstream 
(exploration and production) and downstream (refining, marketing, etc) activities, but I 
will focus on their role in upstream oil production in this paper.  The actual extraction of 
oil from the well presents the critical stage where property rights (mineral rights, when 
referring to oil) matter most.  The property rights at this stage determine who owns the oil 
once it emerges from the ground and who controls the rate at which the extraction takes 
place.  
With the Iraqi parliament trying to control its transitional democracy, the question 
of how to manage that country’s immense oil reserves has sparked many international 
debates between scholars, economists, geologists, politicians and activists.  The central 
question, it seems, is who will own and control those reserves.  In February 2006, a 
negotiating committee submitted a draft arrangement for assigning mineral rights to the 
Iraqi cabinet.  According to a report in The New York Times, sources indicated that 
foreign oil companies would participate in Iraqi oil development, though the central 
government in Baghdad will retain “substantial control over revenues” and the right to 
review contracts with foreign oil companies (Glanz, 2007). 
 The oil extraction rate refers, as the term implies, to the rate at which oil is 
withdrawn from the ground.  The extraction rate varies widely among oil-producing 
states, and carries important economic and environmental consequences.  Some 
governments have expressed concern over hasty depletion of their finite reserve pools 
and the threats to a sustainable government revenue source this depletion poses.  Others 
have expressed concern over intergenerational equity, with velocious production today 
depriving future generations of an important commodity.  It is widely held that extracting 
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oil too quickly can reduce natural subsurface pressure and trap petroleum, requiring the 
trapped oil very expensive to extract.  For these and other reasons, policymakers should 
look very carefully at the rate at which oil is extracted in their countries.  
 This thesis will explore the interplay between oil, mineral rights allocation and 
extraction rates.  What relationship exists between the assignment of ownership and 
control over oil and the rate at which that oil is extracted in the world’s major oil-
producing nations?  Do national governments endanger the long-term accessibility of 
their oil reservoirs by ceding control over extraction rates to private companies?  While 
various political, economic, social and scientific factors affect the rate of extraction in the 
world’s oil producing nations, I will concentrate on how the assignment of mineral rights 
affects this rate. 
 My thesis proceeds as follows.  In Section II, I explore the literature on property 
rights, extraction rates, and oil industry organization in selected countries.  In Section III, 
I outline the spectrum of mineral rights allocation that I use in the study.  In Section IV, I 
develop hypotheses about the relationship between property rights and extraction rates.  
In Section V, I introduce the statistics on oil wealth and the data used in the study.  In 
Section VI, I present a statistical comparison, revealing any differences in the mean 
extraction rate that accompany cross-country differences in the assignment of property 
rights in the oil industry.  In Section VII, I present a discussion of the results found in 
Section VI, and offer conclusions on the study in Section VIII. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Property Rights 
 In examining mineral rights allocations, many economists study common-
property problems surrounding oil extraction.  These studies tend to focus on the single-
field common pool problem, yet they provide an important backdrop to any analysis in 
the variability of oil extraction rates across countries and industry structures.  The 
technology behind oil drilling creates a dilemma where pumping at a faster rate today 
will reduce the amount of extractable oil available in the future.  If the rate of extraction 
is too fast, the reservoir loses subsurface pressure and pockets of oil can become trapped, 
rendering them unreachable or requiring prohibitively expensive technology for 
extraction (Viscusi, et al, 2005).   
This common property problem manifests itself when two or more wells, owned 
by two or more different agents, draw from the same reservoir.  Each individual owner 
will pump as quickly as possible to maximize short-term profit, as any oil he leaves in the 
ground today is available not just for him, but for any of the owners to extract in the 
future.  For every barrel an owner leaves in the ground instead of extracting, he loses a 
portion of that hypothetical barrel to his co-owners’ drilling.  Since the other agents’ 
drilling reduces the amount of oil available for him to drill in the future, each individual 
agent will drill at a faster rate under co-ownership than he would if he owned the entire 
reservoir himself.  In doing so, however, the amount of oil available in the future to the 
group decreases, such that each owner, in seeking to maximize his own short-term 
profits, actually threatens his long-term potential for profit. 
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 This phenomenon is neither novel nor negligible.  As far back as 1914, the U.S. 
Bureau of Mines estimated that common pool losses equaled a quarter of total domestic 
oil production.  The Federal Oil Conservation Board estimated that recovery rates (the 
amount of oil that can be extracted from a given well) dropped from roughly 90 percent 
under complete ownership to 25 percent or less in common pool reservoirs.2
 Ronald Coase helped bring the common pool problem to the public’s attention 
with his 1960 article, “The Problem of Social Cost.”  In the paper, Coase acknowledged 
the tremendous negative externalities parties can impose on society when they bear 
disproportionately low portions of the costs and consequences of their actions.  He argued 
that, as long as transaction costs remain low, society could overcome these losses by 
assigning property rights to one party and allowing a market to arise in which these 
property rights are traded. 
 Henning Bohn and Robert T. Deacon (2000) take the analysis of property rights 
and extraction rate variation in a different direction.  They argue that the strength or 
weakness of the property rights system in a given economy can manifest itself through 
two competing phenomena. 
 First, they argue, “Weak ownership forestalls the physical and human-capital 
investments needed for economic development” (526).  In their view, outcomes in 
capital-intensive extractive industries like oil production are closely related to property 
rights institutions and the degree of risk in the environments in which they exist.  In low-
risk environments with secure property rights and a stable rule of law, firms will invest in 
capital “to maximize the present value of output minus investment cost, taking into 
account the probability that future profits will be expropriated” (529).  Thus, in an 
                                                 
2 Cited in Yuan p. 2 
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environment with a high perceived probability of capital loss (due to a weak property 
rights system, political instability or weak rule of law), firms will under-invest in capital, 
leading to declines in extraction rates, ceteris paribus. 
 On the other hand, however, high ownership risk could yield higher extraction 
rates.  With the availability of future resources uncertain in a high-risk environment, 
firms will tend to extract as much as possible in the present period, given the limitations 
of distribution and storage channels.  The authors find, however, that while this second 
phenomenon exists in some natural resource industries (timber harvesting, for example), 
it does not apply to capital-intensive industries like oil production. 
 The authors conclude that “insecure ownership slows the extraction of petroleum” 
by decreasing investment in capital equipment needed for extraction.  Thus, they argue, 
“stocks of capital-intensive resources should remain largely unexploited in poor 
countries, because the lack of ownership…hampers accumulation of capital needed for 
extraction” (527).  My study will control for such variables as wealth and corruption that 
may mediate the relationship between mineral rights allocation and extraction rate. 
 
Extraction Rates 
Others have focused more narrowly on the consequences of accelerated 
extraction.  Many economists studying the extraction of depletable natural resources have 
attempted to derive a profit-maximization function for producers, given the finite (or 
even declining, if extracted from a well too fast) amount of extractable oil available.  
Holding all else constant, producers will seek to maximize the present value of returns, 
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given information on the quantity of known reserves, the price they expect to receive 
from the oil once extracted, and the cost they expect to incur extracting it.   
Much of the debate surrounding natural resource depletion policy stems from 
Harold Hotelling’s 1931 article, “The economics of exhaustible resources,” in which he 
proposes an optimal rate of natural resource depletion.  Among the first to apply a 
neoclassical economic analysis to the study of natural resources, Hotelling proposes a 
hypothetical publicly-owned pool of a nonrenewable natural resource.  “How should 
exploitation take place for the greatest general good, and how does a course having that 
objective compare with that of the profit-seeking entrepreneur,” he asks (139).  Hotelling 
argues that legislation promoting conservation results in a suboptimal rate of extraction 
for society.  This lower rate serves monopolists’ interests by artificially restraining 
supplies of the mineral and driving prices up.   
In modeling the natural resource producer’s optimal extraction rate, Hotelling 
notes that, when a producer can affect prices, he will choose a rate of extraction such that 
the mineral’s net price (price minus marginal cost) will rise over time in step with the 
interest rate.  By extracting too much today, he could flood the market and reduce prices.  
By drilling too slowly, however, he may “postpone profits farther into the future than the 
rate of interest warrants” (139). 
Hotelling’s ideas have remained prominent in the natural resource literature to 
this day.  In recent years, economists have debated the best measures of cost to use in 
calculating Hotelling’s price-driven optimal extraction rate.  Cairns and Davis (1998), 
Eisenhauer (2003) and others have argued for alternative measures of the producer’s net 
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price in modeling the optimal extraction rate by including average cost, among other 
measures, in their equations. 
 Given these ideas about optimal price-driven extraction rates, M. King Hubbert 
proposed a model for predicting trends in worldwide oil extraction rates.  When Hubbert 
presented his “peak oil theory” to the American Petroleum Institute in 1956, the bell-
shaped Hubbert Curve of oil production rose to immediate prominence in literature 
concerning optimal oil extraction rates.  Hubbert predicts that when oil is first discovered, 
production will increase at an accelerating rate as new exploration activity discovers new 
reservoirs and technological improvements allow for faster and more efficient extraction.  
At some point, however, this production will peak.  As new fields become increasingly 
difficult to find, and the geology and technology of existing wells lead to production 
decreases, overall production rates will steadily decline until production reaches zero. 
 Hubbert predicted in 1974 that world oil production would peak in 1995 (Grove, 
1974), but changes in consumption in the 1970s and 1980s threw his prediction off track.  
While Hotelling’s model has held enormous sway in the field for nearly a century, its 
application to this study is less straightforward.  In today’s global oil market, large 
producers and cartels (i.e. OPEC) can certainly affect prices, but smaller producers’ 
production decisions will exact a much smaller effect on global prices.  Holding 
variations in quality, density, gravity and other distinguishing characteristics of different 
oil sources constant, crude oil in the world market is relatively fungible.  Thus, small 




Property Rights and Extraction Rate 
Expanding on Hotelling’s work, Varouj Aivazian and Jeffrey Callen (1979) show 
that a firm’s “optimal extraction rate is highly sensitive to the nature of the industry 
structure governing the production of the resource” (83).  Because of both the collective 
property problem and the ability of monopolists to affect price, Aivazian and Callen 
argue that industry structure and competition play important roles in determining oil 
extraction rates.  Aivazian and Callen’s research supports the idea that international 
variation in oil extraction rates could be related to the structure of property rights 
governing the extractive industries in those countries.  However, given the nature of the 
global oil market and the presence of many oil fields within a given country, it is unclear 
whether their model applies to this study. 
 
Intergenerational Equity
 R.M. Solow (1974) discusses natural resource depletion with respect to 
intergenerational equity—the notion that per-capita consumption remains constant over 
time.  He finds, however, that earlier generations have little obligation to conserve 
nonrenewable natural resources for their descendants.  Assuming that natural resources 
and capital are inputs in the production of a given bundle of goods, Solow argues, from a 
utilitarian perspective, that advances in technology and capital accumulation can 
compensate for declining stores of natural resources.  Thus, he argues, “Earlier 
generations are entitled to draw down the [resource] pool (optimally, of course!) so long 
as they add (optimally, of course!) to the stock of reproducible capital” (41). 
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 Bohn (2003) also writes that policy makers tend to see future generations as more 
risk tolerant than current generations.  Such a finding may support the hypothesis that 
current generations will extract oil at a faster than optimal rate if they believe that future 
generations will bear the risk of depleted oil reservoirs.   
 
National Oil Companies 
While many scientists have studied the factors moderating oil extraction rates, 
national oil companies have, for the most part, escaped the economic lens.  As Charles 
McPherson (2003) points out, “there has been surprisingly little systematic research on 
NOCs.  Literature on NOCs is limited…and organized, comprehensive data is virtually 
nonexistent”(184).  Some studies, however, have highlighted the implications of states’ 
mineral rights allocation choices.  
Many economists hold that state-owned enterprises are generally run less 
efficiently than private-sector corporations that face intense scrutiny from shareholders 
and debt raters (Viscusi, et al).  Particularly in authoritarian states, managers of national 
oil companies are subject to far less scrutiny than their private-sector counterparts.  As a 
result, these managers make production decisions that deviate from Hotelling’s or other 
extraction optimization models.  
In “Global Oil and the Nation State,” Bernard Mommer (2002) explores the 
history of public and private oil management.  According to Mommer’s study, “public 
mineral ownership subject to proprietorial governance offers a greater variety of 
possibilities than private mineral governance; and one may also expect the former to be 
less stable than the latter” (96).  
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Mommer seems to view state-owned companies as the most efficient option for 
oil-producing countries.  He argues that NOCs place the state “in a position to take the 
fundamental decisions regarding the flow of investment, volumes and prices,” allowing it 
to “focus on maximizing ground rent” (97).  He does, however, acknowledge some costs 
associated with such national oil companies, including lost efficiency and productivity.  
Because the actions of NOCs are less visible and transparent than those of their private-
sector counterparts, managers become susceptible to complacency and corruption, often 
leading to inefficient production decisions.  Policymakers need to balance these 
consequences against the above benefits that NOCs can provide. 
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III. Property Rights and Oil: A Closer Look 
In this section, I will explain the three different categories of mineral rights 
allocation into which I place this study’s countries.  Inevitably in such a study, some 
countries fail to fall neatly into one of the categories, and are more difficult to classify 
than others.  In these ambiguous cases, I justify and explain why each mineral rights 
regime was classified as nationalized, privatized or production-sharing agreement (PSA). 
According to a report by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (Bindemann, 
1999), oil reserves are legal property of the state in every country in the world, except for 
the United States.  The distinction, then, comes in the control of the development of fields 
(the upstream oil production industry).  In even the most staunchly free-market 
economies of the world, the government obtains some revenue from oil production, 
whether through taxation, royalty payments, licensing fees, or some other contractual 
measure.  However, by establishing a continuum of control over the extraction of the 
(almost universally state-owned) oil reserves, we can assess the effects of different 
control mechanisms on the management of this public resource.   
This continuum could include dozens of categories, ranging from full 
nationalization of oil operations to buyback agreements, joint ventures, competition 
between NOCs and international oil companies for licenses, and full private 
concessionary systems.  However, given the limited number of significant oil-producing 
nations (43 in this study), I decided to overlook some idiosyncrasies and tried my best to 
roll this continuum into three categories: nationalized, privatized and PSA. These three 
categories will allow for the best quantitative analysis of the relationship between mineral 
rights allocations and oil extraction rates. 
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Kirsten Bindemann has provided one of the most extensive analyses of the 
options facing petroleum-producing states in assigning rights to drill for oil.  Bindemann 
distinguishes between four types of contracts: concessions, production-sharing 
agreements, service contracts and joint ventures.  Greg Muttitt (2005) studied the way 
property rights dictate control over oil production in various countries, and argues, 
“There are essentially three models a country may choose from for the structure of its oil 
industry, plus a number of variations on these themes” (5).  Muttitt’s model varies 
slightly from Bindemann’s, noting that joint ventures really offer only a slight variation 
on the production-sharing agreement.  These studies provide the basis for the three 
groups I use in examining mineral rights allocations in oil producing states. 
 
Nationalized 
First is the nationalized model, in which the state controls the oil reserves, makes 
all production decisions and keeps all revenue.  Under this model, the government 
believes that the state owns the hydrocarbons beneath the soil or ocean in the country’s 
territory.  As a result, the government controls all aspects of extracting these 
hydrocarbons and is often reluctant to cede control over any part of the extraction process 
to foreign entities.  Generally, a national oil company will coordinate the exploration and 
production, and accrued revenues stay within the realm of government control.  
 In some instances, national oil companies contract with private-sector companies, 
often foreign, to conduct part of the production process.  These relationships usually exist 
as technical service contracts or buyback agreements, with well-defined objectives, 
limited time periods and fixed fees. 
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In a buyback agreement, a private-sector oil company invests capital in 
developing an oil field, but the government retains the mineral rights and the profits from 
the project.  In exchange for its investment, the company receives a fixed rate of return on 
its capital, agreed to in the contract.  As this arrangement brings the mineral rights under 
the exclusive stewardship of the home government, it should, in theory, mitigate the 
common pool problem more effectively than any other arrangement.  However, in 
countries with nationalized oil industries, even where the private sector attains technical 
service or buyback contracts, property rights to the oil are never transferred to the private 
companies. 
In some states—Oman and Norway, for example—national oil companies have 
sold shares over equity markets.  Since this thesis is primarily concerned with the effects 
of varying degrees of and mechanisms for government control of oil production, I will 
treat partially-public companies as national oil companies if the state owns more than 50 
percent of the company.  In owning 50 percent or more of the company’s outstanding 
shares, the government still holds a majority stake in the company and exercises control 
over production decisions.  For example, although Statoil is traded over the New York 
Stock Exchange and the Oslo Stock Exchange, the Kingdom of Norway retains 70.9 
percent of the company’s equity, and thus retains control over the company and its 
production decisions. 
In some states, both the national oil company and the private sector can hold 
mineral rights to oil.  Because the government allows non-government entities to hold 
mineral rights, I consider countries with these cases to have privatized oil industries, 
except in cases in which the national oil company produces more than 90 percent of 
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domestic oil.  Because I am studying the link between mineral rights allocation and 
extraction rates, classifying a country in which an NOC produces 90 percent of the 
country’s oil as privatized would introduce a serious flaw to the econometric analysis. 
The express mail industry in the United States presents an analogous situation, in 
which a state owned enterprise competes in certain markets with private sector firms.  
While the United States Postal Service—an organization owned and controlled by the 
federal government—occupies an important share of the overnight-delivery market, one 
would be hard-pressed to classify express mail as a nationalized industry, given the 
presence of UPS, FedEx and DHL, among others.    
 
Privatized 
Instead of producing the oil itself, a government can grant concessions to private 
sector companies to explore and/or drill for oil.  Under such a system, the government 
cedes the mineral rights (often for a limited period of time) to a company or consortium.  
The company then invests capital in developing the licensed reservoir and owns the oil as 
soon as it leaves the ground.  The government would then collect taxes and/or royalties 
on the profit the company earns from production, but ownership and control of the field 
rests with the licensed company for the period the license covers.   
In some cases, the NOC competes with private sector companies for exploration 
and production contracts—perhaps most notably in Brazil.  In such cases, the country 
will fall into the privatized category, unless the NOC has dominant market share.  While 
the NOCs often control major portions of their countries’ oil industries, private 
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companies are free to compete and are entitled to the property rights to the oil as soon as 
it leaves the ground.   
 
PSA 
Third, and most complex, is the production-sharing agreement.  PSAs are 
common in many developing nations, and seem to be the favorite option for major 
international oil companies (Muttitt).  In theory, the state still controls the oil under a 
PSA—or at least controls it in conjunction with the other parties in the PSA.  In practice, 
however, the international oil companies often hold substantial stakes in the agreements 
and control many of the production decisions.  Some energy analysts, including Daniel 
Johnston (1994), have questioned whether any functional difference exists between PSAs 
and concessionary systems. 
 PSAs are most common in developing countries where the governments rely on 
foreign investors to provide the capital needed to bring a field to production.  Often, these 
home governments lack the capital themselves, or prefer to share the risk of exploration 
and production activities with foreign entities. 
The government grants a concession or license for the private sector company to 
explore for and drill oil.  The foreign company bears most of the risk under PSAs.  The 
first quantities of oil produced from the field in question, often called “cost oil,” are 
allocated to the foreign company to compensate it for its investment costs and risk.  Once 
costs have been recovered, the remaining “profit oil” is split between the foreign 
companies and the government in an agreed upon proportion.  Countries with more 
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extensive oil deposits naturally attract more prospective investors, and can sometimes 
leverage this into more favorable PSA terms (i.e. larger shares of profit oil). 
 National oil companies can participate further in PSAs by joining the consortia of 
companies that produce the oil as part of a joint venture (JV).  In these cases, the state 
receives not only its share of the profit oil (as specified in the contract) and whatever 
taxes the private companies owe on their profits, but it also retains the national oil 
company’s share of the consortium’s profits.  Because of the limited sample in this study, 
I do not distinguish between PSAs and JVs in placing each country into the designated 
category.  
 The PSA, in its modern incarnation, originated in Indonesia in the 1960s and is 
now widely employed by countries around the world with economies in transition 
(Paliashvili, 1998).  The following table helps to explain the differences in the above 
categorizations. 
Type of Agreement Petroleum Ownership Foreign Company Control 
Fully Privatized 
(Tax/Royalty System) 
At point of production Extensive  
Production Sharing Contract 
(PSA) 
At point of export Proportional 
Fully Nationalized (buyback 
agreements) 
No title transfer Minimal to none 





 The above classification system accounts broadly for the variations in each state’s 
institutions for governing oil extraction.  However, in such a cross-country analysis, 
certain idiosyncrasies inevitably appear that make it difficult to assign each country into 
one of the above categories.  The notes below help to explain how I assigned each 
country to its group when ambiguities arose. 
 
Angola: Angola is currently a member of OPEC, but only joined in 2007.  It is not 
currently subject to any production quotas and was not a member state during the years of 
production included in this study.  Thus, it is not counted as an OPEC member for this 
study. 
 
Argentina: While still dominated by Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF), the 
Argentine upstream (exploration and drilling) oil production sector underwent major 
privatization in the 1990s as the Argentine economy spiraled into crisis.  The Argentine 
government sold shares in YPF throughout the 1990s, and Repsol, a major Spanish oil 
company made a successful takeover bid in 1999, leading to the formation of Repsol YPF 
(Rehak, 1999).  Pan American Energy, Chevron, and Petrobras Energía also have 
significant projects in the country.  The Argentine government created Enarsa, a new 
state-owned oil company, in 2004 to promote exploration activity.  Enarsa, however, 
remains a minor player in the Argentine oil sector and had little to no impact on 2002-
2004 production, which this study examines (Energy Information Administration [EIA], 
Argentina Country Analysis Brief [CAB]). 
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Brazil: While the government opened the sector to limited competition in 1997, state-
controlled Petrobras still dominates oil production in Brazil.  Some energy analysts point 
to high state and federal taxes and poor licensing terms from the National Petroleum 
Agency to explain the minimal foreign investment since 1997.  Despite a slight increase 
in foreign investment, Petrobras controlled more than 95 percent of domestic crude oil 
production in 2004 (EIA, Brazil CAB).  Thus, I have listed Brazil’s oil industry as 
nationalized. 
 
China: As part of a major restructuring in the 1990s, the Chinese government divided its 
oil interests into three companies, each of which controls several subsidiaries: the China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), The China Petroleum and Chemical 
Corporation (Sinopec) and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).  
These state-owned companies have contracted with multinationals for certain exploration 
and production activities.  However, according to Chinese law, China’s NOCs are 
guaranteed a 51 percent stake in any joint venture.  The state-owned companies can also 
legally take over operations once the contracted firm has recovered its initial costs (EIA, 
China CAB). 
CNOOC and Sinopec are listed on the NYSE and other international exchanges, 
but the Chinese government holds more than 70 percent of outstanding shares in each 
company.  Petrochina, CNPC’s largest subsidiary is also publicly listed in Hong Kong 
and New York, with CNPC holding 90 percent of outstanding shares. 
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Colombia: Colombia has also undertaken significant reforms of its oil industry and has 
emerged as a major oil exporter to the United States in recent years.  State-owned 
Ecopetrol remains a major player in the Colombian oil industry; however, foreign 
companies can now hold 100 percent stakes in fields they operate.  Under these licensing 
rules, Ecopetrol controlled 58 percent of production in 2004 and 54 percent in 2003 
(Ecopetrol). 
 
Denmark: In 1996, the Danish Energy Authority introduced the Open Door Procedure.  
Under this policy, all companies are free to compete for exploration and drilling licenses.  
The Danish government retains a uniform 20 percent of pre-tax profits from oil drilling.  
Since this “royalty” is a fixed percentage, it really functions as a tax, not a controlling 
stake for the government in any drilling operations and private sector companies remain 
free to operate their own rigs (Danish Energy Authority).  Thus, I have listed Denmark as 
a privatized industry, with the government collecting taxes from its licensees. 
 
Ecuador: State-owned Petroecuador’s share in domestic oil production has steadily 
declined since 2001, with the company controlling around 37 percent of production in 
2004 (EIA, Ecuador CAB).  Thus, I have assigned Ecuador to the privatized category for 
this study. 
 
Iran: Article 153 of the Iranian constitution prohibits foreign control over any natural 
resources, including oil.  Thus, foreign involvement in the Iranian oil industry is limited 
to buyback agreements (Al-Attah and Alomair).  Iran conducts buyback agreements with 
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foreign oil companies, in which the companies invest in the production process, but do 
not hold any rights to the oil that is produced.  The agreements cover a fixed period of 
time and stipulate a certain rate of return for the foreign company (van Groenendaal and 
Mazrati). 
 
Kazakhstan: In 2005, the government of Kazakhstan “amended the subsoil law to 
preempt the sale of oil assets in the country” (EIA, Kazakhstan CAB).  In that same year, 
the government required that state-owned company KazMunaiGaz must own at least 50 
percent of any new production sharing operation and that it must act as a contractor in all 
offshore PSAs as well.  These changes certainly push Kazakhstan toward the nationalized 
group.  However, they occurred in 2005, after the time period studied for this thesis.  
Since the study covers 2002-2004, Kazakhstan remains in the PSA group. 
 
Kuwait: Kuwait has entered into a number of Operating Service Agreements (OSAs), 
similar to Iran’s buyback agreements.  Under these OSAs, foreign companies extract 
petroleum, which Kuwait contracts to buy at an agreed-upon price.  The foreign 
companies are neither allowed to hold any equity in the production nor to explore for new 
fields (Al-Attah and Alomair) in Kuwait’s nationalized oil industry. 
 
Norway: Although ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil and BP, among other foreign 
companies, have invested in the enormous Norwegian oil wealth, the Norwegian 
government dominates domestic production.  State-owned Statoil is one of the world’s 
leading producers.  Although Statoil offered a limited number of shares on the Oslo Stock 
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Exchange in 2001, the state still holds more than 70 percent of the company.  Statoil 
controls the majority of oil production in Norway.  The Norwegian government also 
holds a partial stake in Norsk Hydro, a major energy and aluminum company.  
Multinational companies wishing to tap into Norway’s reserves must act in conjunction 
with Statoil (EIA, Norway CAB). 
 
Oman: Oman has a unique system for managing oil production.  Instead of a traditional 
NOC, Oman relies on Petroleum Development Oman (PDO), a consortium consisting of 
the Omani government (60%), Shell (34%), Total (4%) and Partex (2%) to produce oil.  
PDO produces roughly 85 percent of Oman’s oil, with the remaining fraction coming 
through PSAs (EIA, Oman CAB).  Given the significant foreign involvement, the 
absence of any direct concessionary system and a significant number of PSAs, I have 
classified Oman in the PSA category. 
 
Thailand: PTT Exploration and Production, the state-owned oil company in Thailand is 
publicly traded, however, the government of Thailand still holds a controlling (more than 
66 percent) stake in the company.  ChevronTexaco and CNPC of China, among other 
international companies, have won exploration licenses in the partially privatized Thai oil 
industry (EIA, Thailand CAB).  Because the private sector competes with PTT, I have 
classified Thailand as privatized.  
 
Trinidad and Tobago: State-owned Petrotrin controls around 50 percent of domestic 
production and retains small stakes successful exploration ventures.  However, 
multinationals also flourish in Trinidad and Tobago’s major reservoirs in the Caribbean 
 26
Sea and Atlantic Ocean (Moon, 2006).  Because of the strong presence of multinationals 
in the market, I classified Trinidad and Tobago as privatized. 
 
UAE: Each of the United Arab Emirates controls its own oil, with Abu Dhabi controlling 
more than 90 percent of the UAE’s reserves (United Arab Emirates).  The Abu Dhabi 
National Oil Company operates primarily through joint ventures (a form of PSA) with 
multinational oil majors. 
 
 
 Each government must decide how to allocate the mineral rights to the oil within 
its borders and can choose a system ranging from concessionary to fully nationalized.  
The rest of this paper will examine the consequences this decision has on the rate at 






 Existing theories and literature on oil ownership and extraction suggest competing 
hypotheses.  In this section, I develop the hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
the structure of oil ownership in a given country and the rate at which the oil is extracted.  
  
A. Private Ownership Leads to Faster Extraction than State Ownership 
 
One set of theories suggests that, given the characteristics that usually define 
state-owned oil companies and large corporations (such as BP or ExxonMobil) and the 
motivations that drive these companies, private ownership of oil will lead to faster 
extraction from the ground. 
 
Shareholder Pressure May Lead to Increased Extraction Rates for Private-Sector 
Firms 
Most major oil companies face pressure from shareholders and financial markets 
to secure strong short-term profits.  Such pressure could lead to myopic policies and 
over-extraction that erodes long-term profit potential.  While many NOCs have offered 
shares to the public, including Norway’s Statoil and China’s CNOOC, governments 
almost always maintain majority stakes and effective control over the companies.  While 
managers of private sector firms are often forced to offer transparent reports to 
shareholders, national governments seldom face the same pressure.  This ownership and 
control allows the NOCs to act in a way that will protect long-term profit.  
As Saudi Aramco President and CEO Abdallah S. Jum'ah (2004) told a 
conference on global energy security, “the short term results that financial markets 
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typically desire can undermine some companies' ability to adapt a long-term view. At 
Saudi Aramco we are fortunate in that we are not subject to undue pressure for short term 
results [and] this dynamic has allowed us to maintain a much higher reserve to production 
ratio than is typical for our industry (Jum’ah, 2004).” 
 
Under Concessionary Systems, Free-riding Companies Will Extract Oil Quickly 
 Many countries that operate under concessionary licensing systems grant private 
companies mineral rights to drill specific blocks for a limited number of years.  In such 
cases, the companies are really renting the mineral rights, not owning them.  Since the 
companies have no stake in the long-run viability of the reservoirs, they will over-drill 
during the period of their lease.  As discussed above, over-extraction can trap pockets of 
oil, rendering them inaccessible for the future.  The home government or the next holder 
of the lease will suffer as a result.  These future production losses are foreseeable and 
avoidable with the right set of mineral rights allocations. 
 
Weak Property Rights Will Affect Extraction Rates in the Private Sector 
 As Henning and Bohn (2000) argue, private companies will accelerate their 
extraction when they feel their property rights are threatened.  So, in countries with weak 
rule of law, corrupt governments or non-secure property rights, private-sector firms will 
likely feel more pressure to over-extract than NOCs would.  For example, managers of a 
multinational oil company might fear that an over-reaching government in a given 
country might seize their company’s assets and fields, as the Russian government 
allegedly did in the Yukos Oil Company scandal.  In such a case, the managers would 
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increase current production, perceiving their future profits as threatened by the prospects 
of government action.  NOCs, inherently tied to their governments, are not subject to the 
same pressure. 
 Mark Thoma (2006) has proposed another link between nationalization and 
production rates.  He argues that as governments increase their ownership stakes in oil 
production, or seize assets of private companies operating in their jurisdiction, foreign 
companies will reduce their capital investments.  This decreasing investment, Thoma 
argues, decreases long-run production rates as companies fail to replace aging and 
obsolete equipment.  Nationalization will also make companies less likely to invest in 
exploration activities, as the threat of seizure of profits or assets reduces the expected 
value of their profits from oil production.  
 
Other Factors Affecting Extraction Rate Variation 
Several other factors support the hypothesis that NOCs will extract oil at a slower 
rate than private sector companies.  For one, NOCs may also factor intergenerational 
equity considerations into their oil production decisions.  Some state-owned companies 
see themselves as guardians of the nation’s, and, by extension, the people’s oil wealth, 
and may feel obligated to protect this wealth for future generations.  This reasoning 
would support the hypothesis that national oil companies tend to extract oil at a rate 
slower than foreign companies’.  
Indeed, Mr. Jum’ah believes that NOCs can mitigate the common pool ownership 
problem and prevent over-extraction.  By maintaining a low and steady depletion rate, 
NOCs can more effectively maximize long-term profit than can private sector firms.  
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Low depletion rates also harmonize with other goals that help to maximize profit, 
including OPEC’s supply restriction.  Some OPEC-member NOCs may even appeal to 
environmental concerns or “peak oil” depletion theories to justify their production 
decisions and defend themselves against accusations of cartel behavior.  
According to Jum’ah, the average depletion rate of a Saudi Aramco field hovers 
around two percent per year, less than half the industry average.3  When building 
facilities for the vast Sheiba field, Aramco sought to achieve a depletion rate of less than 
one percent per year, and has met that goal through the first stage of production.  Jum’ah 
argues that this low depletion rate is attributable to Aramco’s position as a national oil 
company, and that private sector firms operating in the same fields would extract at a 
faster rate.  As he explained, the “key principles that govern the management, production 
and depletion” of Aramco reserves include maximizing ultimate recovery of 
hydrocarbons, reservoir monitoring and “gradual depletion.” 
             Geopolitics can also play an important role in determining the rate of oil 
production.  In 1973, for example, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OAPEC) shut down oil exports to Western nations that supported Israel in the 
Yom Kippur War.  To this day, energy security remains paramount in the minds of 
diplomats and foreign policy experts.  The threat of production decreases or export 
embargoes constantly influence our posture toward Venezuela, Iran, the Gulf states and 
other oil exporters.  Any time a government controls a nationalized oil industry, politics 
stand to affect production decisions. 
 
                                                 
3 Some, including energy investment banker Matthew Simmons (2005), challenge the extent and 
accessibility of Saudi Arabia’s remaining reserves.  Saudi Aramco, however, claims that it has succeeded in 
maintaining low depletion rates.  
 31
B. Private Ownership Leads to Slower Extraction than Government Ownership 
 
            There is also reason to believe that national control could lead to faster depletion 
than private control would.  In some cases, major importing nations—including the 
Untied States—exert pressure on suppliers to maintain a steady stream of oil inputs, often 
resulting in faster extraction rates.  National oil companies, inherently tied to their home 
governments and their foreign policy, may more willingly accede to political demands 
from other governments than multinational private-sector oil companies. 
 
Political Pressure on NOCs Affect Extraction Rates 
While political pressure can lead to cuts in production (e.g. the 1973 oil crisis), it 
can also lead to accelerated extraction.  Producing nations might increase production to 
meet the import needs of world powers in exchange for military assistance, favored trade 
status, decreased scrutiny of human rights violations, or other perks.  For example, 
Matthew Simmons (2005) has argued that undue pressure from the United States is 
leading Saudi Arabia to overproduce its oil fields, possibly leading to sub-surface 
pressure loss and damaged reservoirs.  Such pressure would not work as well with 
private-sector companies, who respond to markets and shareholders more than diplomats 
and political leaders.  So, this political pressure would seem to affect extraction rates 
more for countries in the nationalized group—where political leaders can control NOCs 
and their production rates—than in the privatized and PSA groups. 
In a similar vein, the United States has used its military strength to ensure that its 
oil suppliers continue to produce oil at a sufficient rate.  For example, the U.S. has gone 
to great lengths to ensure a steady stream of oil imports from Colombia in recent 
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years.  Late in his presidency, Bill Clinton promised $1.6 billion in military aid to 
Bogota, including helicopters, communications equipment and training (Klare, 2000).  
With Colombia supplying more than ten million barrels of oil to the United States each 
year, government officials have taken serious interest in securing the supply route (EIA, 
U.S. Imports by Country of Origin).  In 2003, President Bush sent U.S. troops to 
Colombia's Arauca province to train troops in intelligence gathering and 
counterinsurgency tactics.  The troops hope to prevent further attacks by Marxist rebels 
against the Cano Limon pipeline, which supplies the U.S. with a significant portion of its 
foreign oil (BBC, 2003).  While such intervention is not unique to Colombia, home 
governments may be more likely to welcome foreign troops if they hold a controlling 
stake in their oil than if most of the oil belongs to multinational companies. 
Some NOCs engage in politically motivated activity at home that could lead to 
overproduction.  Perhaps most prominent of these activities are the subsidies common in 
developing countries.  Governments with NOCs often try to win favor with their citizens 
by offering gasoline at prices well below market levels. 
For many years, Indonesia’s Pertamina subsidized petroleum products at $3 
billion annually, although the government significantly reformed its subsidization policy 
in September 2005 (McPherson, 190).  In Iran, gasoline has hovered under 50 cents per 
gallon in recent years, supported by major subsidies on imported refined petroleum 
products.  Such subsidization policies from NOCs could distort purchasing incentives and 
increase the quantity of oil demanded, perhaps creating undue pressure for faster 
extraction.  Figure 4.1, below, depicts this situation.  S represents the supply function for 
gasoline and SI represents the gasoline supply curve with subsidies.  Correspondingly, the 
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quantity of gasoline demanded shifts from Q* to QI under a subsidy program.  Thus, a 







 Political, financial, and engineering factors all bear on a company’s decision on 
how quickly to extract its oil.  As I have shown in this section, pressure from 
shareholders and other operating conditions may lead private sector oil companies to 
extract oil quickly, in search of short-term profits.  On the other hand, political 





 In this section, I discuss the data used in the empirical analysis of the relationship 
between oil extraction rates and property rights assignments, and the sources used to 
obtain these data. 
 
 
Sample—In order to create a broad sample of countries for the study, I decided to use all 
significant oil-producing states for which data are available.  After conducting 
preliminary research, I found that beyond the top forty or fifty producing states, reliable 
data about domestic oil-producing industries became difficult to find.  As a result, I 
decided to include all 43 states that produce an annual average of at least 100,000 barrels 
of crude oil per day. 
 To conceptualize the sharp drop-off in production after the top forty or fifty 
countries, consider the following.  Saudi Arabia, the world’s leading oil supplier, 
produces roughly 100 times more oil per year as Germany, the number 48 producer (EIA, 
International Energy Annual 2004).  Only 75 countries produced 10,000 barrels per day 
or more in 2004, and only the 43 countries included in this study produced an average of 
at least 100,000 barrels per day between 2002 and 2004.  In fact, with only 94 countries 
producing any oil over this period, the number 44-94 ranking countries combined to 
produce less than Libya, the number 17 producing country.  18 countries in the world 
produced over one million barrels per day over that period, with Saudi Arabia averaging 
8.5 million.  Thus, a larger sample of producing countries seems impractical and 
undesirable.  Moreover, it is unlikely that a larger sample size would have produced 
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enough evidence to conclude with confidence that mineral rights allocation significantly 
affects extraction rates. To account for variations in annual production, I used those states 




Extraction Rate—The extraction rate is calculated by dividing production by reserves, 
to give an estimate of the number of years a given country could continue to produce at 
its current rate of extraction before it runs out of oil.  The extraction rate is the inverse of 
the more commonly used Reserve/Production (R/P) ratio.  As Congress described in a 
2004 report, “a standard measure of the potential availability of oil over time is the 
reserve to production ratio (R/P).  The R/P can be interpreted as the number of years that 
the existing reserve base can sustain the current level of production” (Pirog). 
In order to control for variations in annual production due to price, natural 
disasters, or other volatile elements, I have taken the average production figures from the 
last three years for which the EIA provides data for all this study’s countries (2002, 2003 
and 2004).  
Annual proven reserve estimates also fluctuate over time.  Proven reserve 
estimates represent the known oil reserves that can be extracted at a reasonable price, 
given existing technology.  On the one hand, reserve estimates can decline each year as 
they are depleted through production.  On the other hand, reserve estimates can actually 
rise from one year to the next if exploration activities find new fields or if new drilling 
technologies make currently unrecoverable reserves accessible.  To incorporate end-of-
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year estimates that correspond to the above production figures, I have used the proven 
reserve estimates for each country provided by the EIA on January 1, 2003, January 1, 
2004 and January 1, 2005. 
To create the variable, I calculated the average annual crude oil production figure 
for each country and converted the figure into thousands of barrels per year.  Annual 
production figures come from the EIA’s World Crude Oil Production 1980-2004 table.  
The production figures measure the amount of crude oil (including lease condensate) 
produced within each country in a given year. 
 I then looked at each country’s end-of-year reserve estimates provided by the EIA 
(in billions of barrels) for the corresponding years (January 1 2003-2005) and calculated 
an average.  I selected the January 1, 2003 reserve estimate as a measure of end-of-year 
2002 reserve figures, with the same logic holding in 2004 and 2005.  I converted the 
variable into thousands of barrels and used it to calculate each country’s rate of 
extraction.  Figures on reserves come from the EIA’s International Petroleum (Oil) 
Reserves and Resources Tables and Reports.  Figures represent proved reserves and were 
compiled by the EIA for the United States.  For other countries’ reserves, the EIA relies 
on estimates from Oil and Gas Journal. 
 
Independent Variables—Dummy Variables 
NATL—This is a dummy variable, set to one if a country is assigned to the nationalized 
group, and set to zero otherwise.  I designed the variable to highlight any causal 
relationship between mineral rights assignment and extraction rate.  
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PRIV—Similar to NATL, PRIV is a dummy variable set to one if a nation as a privatized 
system, and zero otherwise. 
 
PSA—PSA is a dummy variable set to one if a country has uses mainly PSAs to manage 
mineral rights, and zero otherwise. 
 
OPEC—Of the eleven countries classified as nationalized in their mineral rights 
structures, six are members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.  
OPEC meets regularly to set production quotas, and its eleven members currently control 
roughly 40 percent of world’s oil supply (Gismatullin, 2007).  With such market power, 
OPEC members’ production decisions significantly affect oil prices.  As a result, 
decisions to limit production (low extraction rate) for these countries could result from 
OPEC cartel behavior—not purely deriving from its mineral rights structure.  The OPEC 
dummy variable attempts to control for this effect.  It is set to one if the country is an 
OPEC member, and zero otherwise. 
 
Other Independent Variables 
HDI—The Human Development Index is a summary measure of human development 
calculated by the United Nations Development Program.  For this study, HDI figures 
were taken from the 2006 Human Development Report.  HDI is a composite of three 
main areas of human development: health and longevity (measured by life expectancy at 
birth), knowledge (according to various measure of literacy and school enrollment) and 
standard of living (measured by GDP in purchasing power parity).  Higher HDI scores 
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indicate higher levels of human development.  I include this variable to control for 
economic development and general infrastructure that could potentially affect extraction 
rates. 
 
Oil/GDP—This variable helps to control for the position of oil in each country’s 
economy.  While imperfect, the variable picks up important effects, which I explain in 
detail in Discussion (Section VII).  In short, I include the variable to control for any 
effects that dependence on oil could exert on extraction rates.  There are several reasons 
to suspect a relationship between the two variables. 
 First, countries with high Oil/GDP values may suffer from Dutch Disease, a 
decline in manufacturing and other sectors resulting from an inflow of revenue from 
natural resource development.  In some countries, the discovery of vast quantities of 
petroleum may have distracted governments and investors from developing other 
industries and meeting other goals.  In other countries, an influx of revenue from oil sales 
may cause inflation in currency exchange rates, which makes their manufacturing sector 
less competitive in the global market.  Table 6.2 confirms this notion.  A strong negative 
correlation exists between Oil/GDP and HDI, suggesting a negative relationship between 
economic development and economic reliance on oil.  These countries, if they understand 
the consequences of their reliance on oil, may intentionally restrict present extraction of 
oil to preserve the opportunity to exploit reserves for economic gain in the future.  If oil 
presents their only path to wealth, these countries have incentive to preserve their 
reservoirs for as long as possible. 
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 Second, consistent with theories of monopoly supply restriction, countries that 
have deep reservoirs of oil and rely heavily on oil export revenues may intentionally 
restrict production—and, in turn, extraction rates—in order to receive higher market 
prices.  Thus, we can expect countries in which oil export revenue comprises a larger 
section of GDP to extract oil at a lower rate than countries with lower values of Oil/GDP.  
While many OPEC members show high values for Oil/GDP, the Pearson correlation 
coefficient for the OPEC dummy variable and Oil/GDP is only 0.28, suggesting that 
these two variables each have an independent effect on extraction rate.  I calculated 
Oil/GDP using export data from the World Petroleum Supply and Disposition, 2003 table 
in the EIA’s International Energy Annual 2004, the last year for which export data are 
available for all countries in this study.  I then multiplied total barrels of crude oil 
exported by the average spot price of one barrel of Brent Crude Oil in 2003.  Brent Crude 
is only one classification of oil, and each country’s product varies slightly in gravity, 
sulfur concentration, ease of refining and other factors.  However, Brent Crude is widely 
used as a benchmark for world crude oil prices. 
 This variable is imperfect for several reasons.  First, while the Brent Crude price 
is a good estimate of world crude prices, it does not account for the variations due to each 
country’s oil quality.  Second, I only looked at exports of crude oil.  Some countries, 
including China, India and the United States export large amounts of refined oil products 
(i.e. gasoline or jet fuel), but relatively small amounts of crude oil.  This figure does not 
account for these refined exports.  Some countries may also produce large amounts of 
crude oil, but consume it domestically.  Thus, while they do not earn revenue from crude 
oil exports, upstream crude production could still play an important role in these 
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countries’ economies.  While imperfect, Oil/GDP appears to be the best available 
measure of the importance of oil to each country’s economy. 
 
CPI—The Corruption Perceptions Index, calculated each year by Transparency 
International, is a composite index of polls and surveys conducted by a variety of 
institutions.  The CPI measures, according to Transparency International’s website, 
“perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country 
analysts.”  Figures for this study were taken from the 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index 
report.  I include CPI to control for variations in perceived political integrity and rule of 
law, which, when weak, may lead to higher extraction rates. 
 
Consumption—Consumption measures annual per capita energy usage in each country.  
Consumption is calculated using 2002 consumption estimates from the World Energy 
Council’s Survey of Energy Resources report.  I divided consumption estimates by 2005 
population figures obtained from the World Development Indicators Online database.4
 
GDP/Cap—GDP per capita statistics help to control for a state’s wealth, although they 
overlap to an extent with Consumption and HDI.  I calculated GDP/Cap using a 2002-
2004 average of GDP statistics from the World Development Indicators online database.5
 
                                                 
4 SER report did not provide estimates for Vietnam, Kuwait, Trinidad and Equatorial Guinea.  Estimates for 
these countries are for 2004 and come from the CIA World Factbook. 
5 WDI GDP data not available for Brunei, Iraq, Qatar and Turkmenistan.  Figures for these countries 
represent the most recent GDP data available for each country on the CIA World Factbook as of March 15, 
2007. 
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Reserves—This variable represents the total number of barrels of crude oil in reserves 
available to each country, according to the EIA. 
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Tables and Statistics 
Table 5.1: Country Statistics 








Algeria 558911.4 10.77133 0.051889 X   
Angola 346827.7 5.412 0.064085   X 
Argentina 281648 2.791227 0.100905  X  
Australia 191514.6 2.830333 0.067665  X  
Azerbaijan 114578.2 7 0.016368   X 
Brazil 538821.6 9.140567 0.058948 X   
Brunei 62185.9 1.35 0.046064 X   
Canada6 740648.1 4.858 0.152459  X  
China 1251200 18.25 0.068559 X   
Colombia 200316.1 1.742193 0.114979  X  
Congo (Brazzaville) 89002.82 1.50591 0.059102   X 
Denmark 138086.3 1.314667 0.105035  X  
Ecuador 162034.2 4.6296 0.035000  X  
Egypt 224338.9 3.7 0.060632   X 
Equatorial Guinea7 135668.3 1.77 0.076649   X 
Gabon 89019.61 2.499 0.035622   X 
India 244293.2 5.385081 0.045365   X 
Indonesia 425837.7 4.8 0.088716   X 
Iran 1361271 113.7667 0.011965 X   
Iraq8 738395 112.5 0.006564 X   
Kazakhstan 331530.5 9 0.036837   X 
Kuwait 779379.3 99 0.007873 X   
Libya 517601.8 34.83333 0.014859   X 
Malaysia 266653.1 3 0.088884   X 
Mexico 1208286 14.29867 0.084503 X   
Nigeria 817822 28.085 0.029120   X 
Norway 1110473 9.737457 0.114041 X   
                                                 
6 Using EIA 2001 production and January 1, 2002 reserve estimates. After 2002, many analysts began to 
include Alberta Oil Sands, dramatically increasing reserve estimates. Current production technology, 
however, cannot produce the oil sands very quickly.  Accordingly, it would be misleading to include the 
Alberta Oil Sands when calculating Canada’s extraction rate. 
7 Reserve estimates from World Oil, January 1, 2005 
8 2002 production and January 1, 2003 reserve figures.  The 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq led to 
instability and a sharp decrease in oil production.  Population figures for Kuwait and Iraq were not 
available from World Development Indicators.  Data for these two countries represent 2006 estimates from 
the CIA World Factbook. 
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Oman 300113 5.506 0.054507   X 
Qatar 264825.9 15.207 0.017415   X 
Romania 42947.48 0.95562 0.044942  X  
Russia 2961985 60 0.049366   X   
Saudi Arabia 3103743 261.8667 0.011852 X     
Sudan 103540.9 0.563 0.183909     X 
Syria 163761.4 2.5 0.065505     X 
Thailand 53670.57 0.58335 0.092004   X   
Trinidad and Tobago 46090.86 0.898667 0.051288   X   
Turkmenistan 69108.13 0.546 0.126572     X 
United Arab Emirates 840521.4 97.8 0.008594     X 
United Kingdom 758012 4.622333 0.163989   X   
United States 2049486 21.97967 0.093245   X   
Venezuela 912022.6 77.60867 0.011752 X     
Vietnam 133272.3 0.6 0.222121     X 




Summary Statistics for Extraction Rates 
 
Table 5.2: Extraction Rates for all Countries in Sample 
Category Minimum Maximum Mean Stand. Dev. Median n 
NATL 0.0066 0.1140 0.0431 0.0364 0.0461 11 
PRIV 0.035 0.164 0.0892 0.0416 0.0926 12 
PSA 0.0086 0.2221 0.0667 0.0553 0.0568 20 
Total 0.0066 0.2221 0.067 0.0589 0.0494 43 
 
 
Table 5.3: Extraction Rates for OPEC Members 
Category Minimum Maximum Mean Stand. Dev. Median n 
NATL 0.0066 0.0518 0.017 0.0172 0.0118 6 
PRIV - - - - - 0 
PSA 0.0086 0.0887 0.0317 0.0327 0.0174 5 
Total 0.0066 0.0887 0.0237 0.0252 0.0119 11 
   
Table 5.4: Extraction Rates for Non-OPEC Members 
Category Minimum Maximum Mean Stand. Dev. Median n 
NATL 0.046 0.114 0.0744 0.026 0.0685 5 
PRIV 0.035 0.164 0.0892 0.0416 0.0926 12 
PSA 0.0164 0.2221 0.0784 0.0572 0.0606 15 
Total 0.0164 0.2221 0.0818 0.0471 0.0666 32 
 
 
Chart 5.1 Extraction Rates 

















Difference in Means t-Tests: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
 
Table 5.5: Difference in Mean Extraction Rates (All Countries in Sample) 
  NATL PRIV   NATL PSA   PRIV PSA 
Mean 0.0430 0.0892 Mean 0.0430 0.0667 Mean 0.0892 0.0667 
Variance 0.0013 0.001 Variance 0.0013 0.0030 Variance 0.0017 0.0031 
Observations 11 12 Observations 11 20 Observations 12 20 
Pooled 
Variance 0.0015  
Pooled 
Variance 0.0025  Pooled Variance 0.0026  
df 21  df 29  df 30  
t Stat 
-
2.8192  t Stat -1.2689  t Stat 1.2135  
P(T<=t) one-
tail 0.0051  
P(T<=t) one-
























Mean 0.0744 0.0892 Mean 0.0744 0.0784 Mean 0.0892 0.0784 
Variance 0.0006 0.0017 Variance 0.0007 0.0033 Variance 0.0017 0.0032 
Observations 5 12 Observations 5 15 Observations 12 15 
Pooled 
Variance 0.0015  
Pooled 
Variance 0.0027  
Pooled 
Variance 0.0026  
df 15  df 18  df 25  
t Stat -0.730  t Stat -0.149  t Stat 0.5489  
P(T<=t) one-
tail 0.2382  
P(T<=t) one-
tail 0.4417  
P(T<=t) one-
tail 0.2939  
t Critical one-
tail 1.7530  
t Critical one-
tail 1.7340  
t Critical one-




Table 5.7: Difference in Mean Extraction Rates (OPEC Members) 




Pooled Variance 0.000641  
df 9  
t Stat -0.96276  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.180411  
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VI. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS AND TABLES 
In this section, I present tables of results from the ordinary least squares regression using 
different combinations of the independent variables presented in Section V.  Extraction 
Rate was the dependent variable in all equations. 
 
Table 6.1: Table of Summary Statistics 






0.00656 0.22212 0.06697 0.04947 0.05895 43 
NATL 0 1 0.2558 0.4415 0 43 
PRIV 0 1 0.2791 0.4539 0 43 
PSA 0 1 0.4651 0.5047 0 43 
OPEC 0 1 0.2558 0.4415 0 43 
Oil/GDP: 
Percent of GDP 
derived from Oil 
exports 
0 119.31 21.42 24.81 15.19 43 
HDI: Human 
Development Index 
0.4390 0.9650 0.7608 0.1342 0.7840 42 
CPI: Corruption 
Perceptions Index 
1.900 9.500 3.910 2.186 3.100 42 
Consumption: 
Per capita energy use 
0.64 52.37 10.04 11.37 5.59 43 
GDP/Cap 366 37995 7967 10465 2146 43 
Reserves: 
Total barrels 





Table 6.2: Table of Correlations 
 R/P NATL PRIV PSA OPEC OIL/GDP HDI CPI Consumption GDP/CAP 
NATL -0.286    
0.063 
         
PRIV 0.283 
0.066     
-0.365    
0.016    




0.000     
-0.580 
0.000 




0.022     
-0.387 
0.010      
0.044 
0.782         
      
OIL/GDP -0.316 
0.039      
-0.030    
0.851     
-0.440    
0.003      
0.422 
0.005      
0.287     
0.062 




0.167     
0.485 
0.001      
-0.624 
0.000 
-0.157   
0.321     
-0.518 
0.000 










0.272     
-0.344 
0.026          
0.725 
0.000 
   
Consumption -0.287 
0.062 
0.222   
0.153     
-0.040    
0.797      
-0.158 
0.312 
0.420     
0.005     
0.049 
0.754          
0.489 







0.662     
0.322  
0.035      
-0.350 
0.022         
-0.041 
0.796     
-0.191 
0.220          
0.715 
0.000   
0.915 
0.000 












0.000     
0.140 
0.369          
0.092 







Cell Contents: Pearson correlation 
                P-Value 
 
 
Table 6.3: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results 
 Regression 
Independent 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 

















Mineral Rights           



































Variables          















GDP/Cap —— 0.0000 (0.283) —— —— 
0.0000 
(0.283) —— —— —— —— 
CPI —— —— 0.0049 (0.159) —— —— 
0.0040 
(0.247) —— —— 
0.0068 
(0.111) 
Consumption —— —— —— -0.0003 (0.676) —— —— —— —— 
-0.0009 
(0.253) 









 S= 0.0434 
R2 =28.4%   
R2(adj)=22.9 
F = 5.16 
S = 0.0433   
R2 =30.6%   
R2(adj)=23.3 
F= 4.19 
S = 0.0432 
R2 =32.6%   
R2(adj)=25.3 
F= 4.47 
S = 0.0439 
R2 =28.7%   
R2(adj)=21.2 
F=3.83 
S = 0.0422 
R2 =35.8%   
R2(adj)=27.2 
F= 4.13 
S = 0.0425 
R2 =36.4%   
R2(adj)=27.5 
F=4.11 
S = 0.0462  
R2 =18.9%   
R2(adj)=12.7 
F=3.03 
S = 0.0423 
R2 =33.8%   
R2(adj)=26.8 
F=4.84 
S = 0.0423 
R2 =38.7%   
R2(adj)=28.2 
F=3.69 
Cell Contents: Coefficient 
                P-Value 
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VII. DISCUSSION 
 The above econometric analysis shows that, while theories suggest a relationship 
between mineral rights structure and rate of extraction, the empirical data do not point to any 
statistically significant relationship between the two.  This “non-effect” appears robust.  The 
coefficients for the mineral rights variables support the hypothesis that countries with 
nationalized oil industries extract their oil more slowly than countries with fully privatized 
upstream oil industries.  The difference in means tests also show that countries with 
nationalized oil industries extract at a slower rate than those with privatized or PSA systems.  
However, when including different combinations of variables in the regression equation, the 
NATL and PRIV dummy variables appear statistically insignificant, with p values reaching 
as high as 0.932.  Thus, it is likely that other variables intervene in the relationship between 
mineral rights structure and extraction rate.  
 Although property rights cannot explain the substantial cross-country variation in 
oil extraction rate, other variables can.  First, the OPEC variable consistently shows a 
significant and large negative effect on extraction rates.  Such a finding makes sense, given 
OPEC’s usual supply-restricting behavior.  In fact, the average OPEC member state extracts 
its oil at a rate more than three times lower than the average non-OPEC member’s.9  At the 
semiannual meetings of the OPEC Conference, representatives of the member states consider 
forecasts of economic activity, oil demand and supply and agree on production quotas for 
each country to follow.10  In extreme cases (such as OAPEC’s 1973 response to the Yom 
Kippur war), major producers can drastically reduce production, driving world oil prices to 
record highs.  However, even under ordinary geopolitical conditions, OPEC member states 
                                                 
9 Average OPEC extraction rate = 0.024; average non-OPEC extraction rate = 0.082 
10 OPEC holds regular conferences twice each year.  In 2006, they added a third conference in December, 
at which point they further reduced production on top of the cuts they made at their October meeting. 
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agree to restrict their production to levels less than those at which they might normally 
extract oil were they not OPEC members.  For example, at its December 2006 meeting, 
OPEC agreed to restrict its joint output to 25.8 million barrels a day, a two percent decrease 
from the quotas it agreed upon in October 2006 (Mouawad, 2006).  At its March 2007 
meeting, OPEC agreed to leave output quotas unchanged, although it would increase pressure 
on member states to abide by quotas (The New York Times, 2007).  Given this downward 
pressure on production levels, the significant negative effect of OPEC membership on 
extraction rates in this data set fits the theoretical assumptions. 
 Oil/GDP, a measure of the significance of oil to each country’s economy also 
shows some significant results in the econometric analysis.  While the coefficient is 
consistently low, countries in which oil revenues comprise a larger portion of GDP tend to 
extract their oil at lower rates than countries in which economic success is less closely linked 
to oil export revenues.   
 The results for CPI indicate that countries with higher CPI scores (i.e. countries 
with lower perceived corruption) tend to extract oil more quickly than others.  This result, in 
and of itself, is neither statistically significant nor revealing.  However, one could argue that 
corrupt officials would lead their countries astray from their ideal energy policies.  In other 
words, those countries that would be best served by extracting oil quickly might have lower 
extraction rates as a result of corruption.  Countries relying on oil for the long term might 
extract oil more quickly if corrupt managers extract profit by producing oil quickly and 
skimming revenue for themselves.  The CPI results also likely pick up the effects of 
perceived rule of law.  As discussed in Chapter II, extraction rates fall as multinational oil 
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companies cut back on investments they fear they could lose in an environment of corruption 
or weak governance. 
 Data on GDP per capita show no effect on extraction rate.  GDP/Cap may, in this 
equation, simply proxy for development, as it is highly correlated with per capita energy use 
and the HDI index (itself a general economic development indicator. 
 The coefficients and p-values for Consumption and Reserves do not show any 
significant effect on extraction rates. 
 Certain variables that could potentially have affected the regression results were 
omitted from this study for lack of available data.  For example, the cost of producing oil 
could significantly affect extraction rates, but was not included in this analysis.  Al-Attar and 
Alomair (2005) argue that mineral rights assignments and upstream oil industry structure are 
largely determined by exploration and production (E&P) costs in a given area.  E&P data, 
however, are not widely available. 
 While the sample size in this study is low by some econometric standards, a larger 
sample would have included relatively insignificant oil producers such as Cuba, Italy and 
Burma.  Any cross-country analysis is limited by the relatively small number of independent 




  While the empirical data show no effect of mineral rights allocations on the rate 
of oil extraction, they point to some important lessons for policymakers working with 
natural resources, and oil in particular. 
 For countries that depend heavily on oil for income, distribution of this oil 
revenue could significantly affect standards of living.  As a result, these countries must be 
careful in managing oil revenue and devise mechanisms for distributing the revenue that 
will insulate their economies from swings in world prices and from corruption and 
mismanagement.   
  Some countries, including Norway, have accomplished this insulation by 
establishing oil funds.  These funds take revenue that accrues to the government from 
taxes, royalties or direct sales income and invest it in secure funds that ensure that future 
generations have access to the country’s oil—if not in kind, then at least in economic 
benefits.  Such funds address the issues of intergenerational equity that abound in 
literature on oil revenue management. 
  The data on OPEC suggest that supranational governments can actually yield 
profound effects on their member states’ economies.  It will be interesting to follow 
Angola’s rate of extraction and see how they change once the newest member nation 
starts subscribing to OPEC production quotas, possibly as early as 2007. 
  As if enough studies had not already discussed this development issue ad 
nauseum, the empirical results on economic dependence on oil and its effect on extraction 
rate prove that Dutch Disease can have a real measurable impact on developing 
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economies.  As states develop new reserves of oil and other commodities, policymakers 
must be cautious not to neglect other areas of their economies. 
  Further studies that may use different methods for categorizing mineral rights 
organization can continue to examine the important effects of mineral rights allocation on 
various indicators of economic or industrial health.  Although this study did not directly 
discover any such effects, I hope that it sheds some light on other related variables and 
contributes to the debate on the optimal policy for allocating mineral rights. 
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